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Abstract 
This paper reconsiders whether implicit discount rates, generally cited as a market 
barrier to conservation, are really too high, and demonstrates that probabilistic choice 
studies of consumer durable purchases and hedonic housing price regression studies mea­
sure similar but non-identical discount factors. Four hedonic regression studies are re­
viewed which attempt to ascertain whether and to what extent the housing market capi­
talizes energy conservation investments. A theoretical model is presented which links the 
probabilistic choice and hedonic regression methods and shows how using results from 
both studies allows measurement of individual discount rates without bias. The paper 
identifies several factors which cause the degree of capitalization to differ from unity, 
resulting in consumer decisions which are rational from the individual perspective, but 
which can lead to low levels of social conservation. 
Market Barriers to Conservation: Are Implicit 
Discount Rates Too High?* 
Jeffrey A. Dubin 1 
1 Introduction 
Ideally, an economy should operate so efficiently that all opportunities for cost-effective 
conservation are exhausted. In reality, however, most individuals fail to take advantage 
of opportunities to invest in energy efficiency. Conditions that discourage energy-efficient 
investments relative to cost-effective levels are known as "market barriers." 
Investing in conservation involves making intertemporal consumption decisions. Many 
factors critically influence these decisions. Insofar as conservation requires the purchase 
of energy-saving capital, the amount of investment consumers choose will depend on its 
financial profitability. Since individuals' budgets are limited, the decision to purchase will 
also depend upon the opportunity cost of making the investment. It is also possible that 
consumers are simply irrational and cannot or will not take their medicine. Is it possible 
to tell whether consumer irrationality is the cause of the alleged underinvestment in con­
servation? Is it possible to demonstrate that there are "market barriers" to conservation 
which actually reside in the market rather than in the heads of the consumer? 
Several studies have addressed these issues.1 But to date all that has conclusively 
emerged is a taxonomy of potential barriers to conservation. These barriers include: 
'This paper wa.s-presented at the Program on Workable-Energy-RegulationC0Ilference on The Eco­
nomics of Energy Conservation held at U.C. Berkeley on June 26, 1992. The comments of the discussants, 
Charles Lave and Steven Stoft, were greatly appreciated. I wish to acknowledge the research assistance 
of Kristina Sepetys and P. Scott Burton, and would like to thank Louis L. Wilde and Charles C. Cicchetti 
for their comments and suggestions. 
!California Institute of Technology and Arthur Andersen Economic Consulting 
1See, e.g., Sutherland(1991), Bates(1991), and Newlon and Weitzel (1991). 
• Attitudes Towards Energy Efficiency-When fuel pnces decline, consumers lose
interest in conserving energy.
• Perceived Riskiness of Energy-Efficiency Investments-Energy-efficiency investments
are made under uncertain conditions (changing fuel prices, technological develop­
ment) and therefore are risky. Most investors are risk averse, resulting in fewer
investments than would be made in a more certain world.
• Imperfect or Asymmetric Information-Much of the information related to energy
efficiency is often asserted to be inadequate, expensive and difficult to obtain. As a
result, conservation investment decisions must be made on the basis of incomplete
or insufficient information.
• Moral Hazards or Misplaced Incentives-In the building sector, decisions regarding
energy-efficient appliances and materials are generally made by the builder or ar­
chitect and not by the consumer. The builder has no incentive to conserve energy
or costs over time, but merely to undertake the minimum initial construction costs.
• Access to Capital or High Initial Costs-A homeowner may decide that an energy­
efficiency investment is economically desirable, but may be precluded from under­
taking such an investment by the high initial costs.
Some authors have attempted to argue that these barriers are illegitimate (see, e.g.,
Sutherland, 1991). But the evidence is inconclusive (see, e.g., Newlon and Weitzel, 1991).
In fact with the exception of the extensive empirical literature which has demonstrated 
that individual discount rates2 exceed social discount rates, the evidence is almost en­
tirely anecdotal.3 Policy analysts on both sides of the market barrier debate have tossed 
the discount figures back and forth and have concluded that either consumers must be 
irrational or that other factors must explain why implicit discount rates are so large. 
Chernoff (1983), for example, has argued that implicit discount rates may reflect the 
influences of risk, uncertainty, and ill-liquidity.4 The evidence either way has relied on a 
set of empirical studies which have attempted to measure the discount rates implicit in 
2We follow the literature (see, e.g., Hartman and Doane(l986)) and define the discount rate to be 
the change in operating costs for a unit change in capital cost. Discount rates are therefore real interest 
rates. 
3Newlon and Weitzel cite interviews with 30 Michigan residents and a field experiment involving 18 
stores in order to -asc-€rtain ,whether,,_informational deficiencies.p.r.eclu.de,.£onsume-rs-.from_making informed 
decisions. Newlon and Weitzel find this evidence properly circumspect. 
4Lowenstein and Prelec (1992) have recently reviewed several anomalies in intertemporal decision 
making. They find that many common intertemporal preference patterns deviate from the predictions 
of neoclassical discounted utility theory. In particular, they note the presence of framing effectsi asym­
metries in the treatment of gains and losses, and effects due solely to the magnitudes of the transactions 
(i.e.i that large dollar amounts are discounted less than are small amounts). Their descriptive model 
of these phenomena is a combination of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and discount 
factors which decline over time but at less than exponential rates. 
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consumer tradeoffs between initial energy-efficiency investment costs, and the long-term 
savings from those investments. The methodologies used in these investigations divide 
into four categories:5 
• Choice Models of Consumer Durable Goods-Multinomial logit or nested logit
specifications for individuals' choices of alternative energy systems are used to reveal
the tradeoffs between operating and capital costs.
• Engineering Models-Prices for alternative technologies (efficient or less efficient
goods such as refrigerators or light-bulbs) are compared to access how changes in
posted prices reflect alternative levels of stated efficiencies.
• Stated Preference-Surveys of individual consumers ascertain stated willingness to
pay for alternative hypothetical payment streams.
• Hedonic price analysis-Regression analysis of home prices as a function of house­
hold characteristics, including relative annual fuel bills or the presence or absence
of thermal integrity measures determine the implicit valuation of conservation in­
vestments.
In Tables 1 and 2, we present summaries of the results from a sampling of the studies. 
The basis for these tables is the compilation presented in Newlon and Weitzel. In addition, 
we have indicated the general approach used in each study (i.e., whether the study used
a choice model or used stated preference, etc. ). Notably absent from the summaries of
either Train (1985) or Newlon and Weitzel is a similar compilation of studies based on 
the hedonic price method. 
As discussed above, the purpose of the hedonic price studies is to determine whether 
or not the residential housing market capitalizes conservation investments. Hedonic price 
studies are important for at least two reasons. First, by reassessing the hedonic studies 
Lowenstein and Prelec's model may partially explain why discount rates estimated from consumer 
durable purchases appear to be much larger than those obtained from the studies of intertemporal 
labor-leisure trade-offs. In the former case, the magnitude of the expected energy savings from the 
purchase of lower energy intensive capital is of a small magnitude as compared with the relatively large 
magnitudes considered in the latter case. Ho\vever, this explanation of "high" discount rates calculated 
in the energy liter-ature jg,at odds with the,.obser"ved. relationship ... between discount ,rates and individual 
incomes. Several studies (see, e.g., Train (1985)) have found that as income rises, implicit discount 
rates decline1 leading researchers to conclude that a serious market barrier to energy conservation is 
ill-liquidity in the capital market. As income rises, however, the energy savings as a fraction of the 
households' budget declines, making their relative magnitudes appear even smaller to the consumer. 
Lowenstein and Prelec's model would predict that discount rates for such consumers should further 
increa;;e (rather than decline, a;; ha;; been observed).
5 A survey of these methods and their findings is provided in Train (1985) and Cambridge Systematics, 
Inc. and Charles River Associates Inc. (1988). 
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and by standardizing their results, we can compare them amongst themselves to gauge 
whether the housing market does capitalize conservation investments and precisely to 
what degree. Second, the extent to which the housing market capitalizes investment will 
determine to a large extent the discount rate households employ in decision making.6 We 
demonstrate below that it is not possible to determine individuals' discount rates from 
consumer choice models without making strong assumptions about the housing market. 
Conversely, it is not possible to separate the degree of capitalization and the implicit 
discount rate from a hedonic regression study without other identifying information. But 
by combining the results of two such studies, we show that it is possible to infer individual 
discount rates. Finally, the analysis will show that previously estimated discount rates 
may have been biased upwards. 
In Section 2, we review four hedonic regression studies which have attempted to 
ascertain whether and to what extent the housing market capitalizes energy conservation 
investment. In Section 3, we present a simple theoretical model which links the choice 
model and hedonic regression methods and shows how using results from both studies it 
is possible to measure individual discount rates without bias. In section 4, we present 
our conclusions. 
2 Hedonic Price Analysis 
Several authors have approached the question of market barriers to conservation through 
studies of the housing market. These studies attempt to determine whether the hous­
ing market capitalizes residential investments in efficiency attributes by estimating the 
contribution to home price of increases in thermal efficiency or decreases in annual fuel 
bills. The technique employed is the hedonic price method of estimating implicit prices of 
various housing attributes, including, for example, various levels of insulation, presence 
or absence of storm windows, and relative levels of energy consumption in addition to the 
more standard set of housing characteristics such as square footage, number of bedrooms, 
etc. 
These studies consistently conclude that household energy efficiency investments are 
capitalized by the housing market, although they typically fail to investigate to what 
degree this is the case. With one exception, these studies have failed to link the im­
plicit values of energy savings as reflected inthe housing market to the revealed level 
of consumer discount rates. Following brief descriptions of four hedonic housing market 
capitalization studies, we calculate the discount rates implied by each study in an at-
6Chernoff (1983) has noted that "the possibility that the individual will not be able to internalize 
future benefits of the durable further raises the discount rate. Life cycle analysts evaluate costs and 
benefits over the physical life of the durable. 
period they expect to own the durable.1'
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tempt to standardize their quantitative implications. A summary of the key aspects of 
each study is given in Table 3. 7 
Johnson and Kaserman (1983) identified two plausible explanations for sub-optimal 
investment in household efficiency: high individual discount rates, and insufficient hous­
ing market capitalization of such investments.8 Johnson and Kaserman estimate the 
marginal effect on home prices of a one-dollar reduction in the occupants' annual fuel 
bill. They then use the market's valuation of this energy savings to estimate an implicit 
market discount rate. 
Johnson and Kaserman used 1978 house transactions data taken from the Knoxville, 
Tennessee multiple listing service (MLS). Their regression analysis used the household's 
annual fuel bill for the period beginning two months after the transaction as a proxy for 
thermal efficiency. Two-stage least squares was used to control for potential endogeneity 
of the household's fuel bill, but no evidence was provided on whether in fact behavioral 
variations in energy consumption were correlated with the purchase decision. 
Johnson and Kaserman's model indicates that each dollar-reduction in the average 
household's annual fuel bill results in a house price increase of $20.73 (1978 dollars). 
Furthermore, Johnson and Kaserman estimate the implicit market discount rate for fuel 
savings to lie in the range 1.5 to 17 percent (assuming a remaining asset life of 15 to 
50 years and an expected real percentage fuel price escalation rate of 0 to 12 percent). 
Johnson and Kaserman conclude that "the housing market appears to operate remarkably 
well in capitalizing future fuel savings." 
Following Johnson and Kaserman, Longstreth, Coveney, and Bowers (1984) attempted 
to estimate the contribution of thermal efficiency to the market value of housing units, us­
ing two alternative surrogates for efficiency: consumption of natural gas, and the presence 
or absence of energy-conserving structural features. The primary data for their study 
came from the Columbus Gas of Ohio (CGO) 1973 natural gas consumption records 
of meters read monthly within the Columbus, Ohio standard metropolitan statistical 
area (SMSA). Self-reported information on structural attributes, including those affect­
ing thermal efficiency (i.e., insulation, storm windows, and window frame type), were 
7lt is not the intention of the present paper to critique the existing hedonic housing market capital­
ization literature. Instead, we take the results of these studies at their face value. There are, however, 
serious questions about the way in which physical energy capital, local climatic conditions, and energy 
inputs should properly enter in"hedonic regression studies. A recent attempt to integrate these factors, 
in a structural model, has appeared in Quigley and Rubinfeld (1989). One conclusion of their analysis 
is that total energy consumption may be a relatively weak substitute with other housing attributes in 
the production of overall household comfort. This finding could possibly confound the interpretation of 
discount factors obtained from standard hedonic regressions. 
8 As we demonstrate below, there is a direct link between individual discount rates and housing 
n1arket capitalization so that Johnson and ICaserman, in fact, identified only one possible explanation 
of household investment inefficiency. 
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obtained via a questionnaire mailed to the addresses of natural gas customers in the 
CGO records. The questionnaire yielded a 54 percent response, with approximately one 
fourth of the respondent's homes having changed ownership during the period 1971 to 
1980 (n = 615 homes). All homes in the sample were therefore previously-owned, owner 
occupied single-family detached dwellings heated with natural gas which had sold be­
tween 1971 and 1980. The sample was biased due to the exclusion of new homes and 
under-representation of homes in the lowest and highest income groups. 
Using a two-stage least squares method with correction for price heteroscedasticity, 
Longstreth, et al. found in their preferred specification that an increase in annual natural 
gas consumption of 100 cubic feet reduced home sale price by approximately $5.10 (1980 
dollars), and that a savings of 11,500 cubic feet (approximately 10 percent of mean 
heating consumption for the sample) would add $548 to the market value of the house. 
They also found that wall and ceiling insulation added $528 and $508, respectively, to 
the sales price of the home. 
Laquatra (1986) performed a cross-sectional analysis of high-efficiency homes con­
structed through the Energy Efficient Housing Demonstration Program (EEHDP) of the 
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) to derive estimates of efficiency values from 
a hedonic regression which incorporated a direct measure of thermal integrity. Under the 
EEHDP, the MHFA solicited bids from regional builders in June 1980 to construct 144 
high efficiency units with a mean projected Thermal Integrity Factor (TIF) ,  measured in 
BTUs per square foot per degree day, of 3. (Conventional Minnesota homes constructed 
during this period had average TIF values of 6-8.) 
Units were constructed throughout the state, with 81 located in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul SMSA. While small, this sample was selected by the author to investigate a market 
in which the thermal integrity of homes was measured and communicated accurately. 
The mean TIF for units in the sample was 1.81 , with a correlation coefficient between 
house sale price and TIF of 0.15, and average total cost for energy-conserving features 
(beyond those required by building codes) of $7,000. 
Hedonic regressions were employed, with the TIF included as an endogenous ex­
planatory variable. For this sample of homes, Laquatra found that energy efficiency is 
capitalized into house sale price, with a price increase of $2,510 for each one unit decline 
in the home's TIF. As shown below, this price increase is at the high end of those found 
in the hedonic studies and is almost surely due to the rules of the EEHDP program. 
In this demonstration project, builders received below-market interim :financing for their 
first unit constructed. Further, the sale prices of the units were restricted and ownership 
was limited to moderate income first-time buyers, some of whom were also eligible for 
low interest, high loan-to-value 30 year loans. 
More recently, Dinan and Miranowski (1989) have constructed a hedonic model to 
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estimate the implicit price paid in the Des Moines housing market for an increase in energy 
efficiency. The primary data source for this study was the Greater Des Moines Board of 
Realtors MLS, from which information on price and structural attributes was obtained. 
This data was matched with that from various other sources, including a homeowner 
survey, and resulted in a final sample size of 234 single-family detached dwellings which 
sold during the period January through June 1982. 
Dinan and Miranowski measured relative household efficiency using a proxy variable 
which is itself based in part on self-reported internal temperature settings, and which re­
flects per-square-foot expenditure necessary to maintain a particular house at 65 degrees 
Fahrenheit. This measure was constructed by adjusting actual winter energy expendi­
tures for differences in internal temperature settings, billing periods, and heated floor 
space. A reduced form prediction of this measure was used in the analysis to control for 
potential endogeneity. 
The preferred specification of Dinan and Miranowski showed that a one-dollar reduc­
tion in the energy expenditures required to maintain a home at 65 degrees during an 
average heating season raised the sales price by approximately $11.63.9 
Each of the studies concludes that the housing market capitalizes household efficiency 
investments; in each case the relevant measure of thermal integrity or annual fuel bill 
was found to be statistically significant. This is by itself an important finding. However, 
the studies generally fail to corroborate whether the market valuations of these energy 
improvements were reasonable. To do this we have collected the relevant external infor­
mation (such as the prevailing price of natural gas and location specific heating degree 
days) required to convert the estimates from each study into discount rates. For reasons 
of comparability, we present these implicit discount rates under a zero expected real fuel 
price increase assumption. Table 4 presents the details of the calculation as well as the 
estimated discount rates for three alternative known planning horizons (15, 25, and 50 
years). Given the implicit prices, non-negative internal rates of return were not always 
determinate. These cases are not reported in the table. 
With the exception of the Laquatra study (which was based on the subsidized demon­
stration housing project), the range of discount rates is remarkably small: from 4.2 to 
8.4 percent. Moreover, these values are not remarkably different from those found in the 
9Dinan and Miranowski's analysis also revealed that the relation�h_ip b�tween price _ _  and required fuel 
expenditures was decreasing at a decreasing rate. This implies that efficiency is valued more highly 
in relatively efficient homes. Furthermore, the contribution to home price of changes in the thermal 
integrity measure was greater in newer than in older dwellings. Dinan and Miranowski speculate that 
these results may be caused by higher visibility and aesthetic appeal of efficiency attributes, in the 
former casei and by differences in the expected remaining life of conservation assets, in the latter case. 
Alternatively, they may reflect differences in income levels which lead less wealthy buyers to buy homes 
with lower thermal efficiency. For a more complete discussion of this point see Dubin and Henson (1988a 
and 1988b). 
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durable purchase literature. However, the estimated discount rates should themselves 
depend on the degree of housing market capitalization, and nothing in the hedonic stud­
ies has measured this important factor. Indeed, as shown in the next section, it is not 
possible to determine the degree of housing market capitalization from hedonic studies 
alone. 
3 The Degree of Housing Market Capitalization 
It is a fundamental property of the residential housing market that not all improvements 
or capital expenditures undertaken by owners are ultimately rewarded to the same degree 
by buyers. The common wisdom from realtors is that adding a bathroom or remodeling 
a kitchen are more worthwhile in terms of resale value than are most other forms of home 
improvement. Some hedonic studies have in fact shown that the dollar value of many 
improvements can have no statistically discernable effect on the sales price of the home. 
Grether and Mieszkowski (1974), for example, included the dollar value of recent home 
improvements (including painting, putting-on new siding, roof repair) in their hedonic
analysis but found that such improvements were not significant. While it can be argued 
that many of these "improvements" were simply an attempt by the owner to bring his 
home up to the average quality of properly maintained homes in the neighborhood, other 
hedonic studies have repeatedly demonstrated that homes with swimming pools will 
often sell for no more than homes without swimming pools even if the owner has gone 
to considerable expense to add this "amenity." 
If consumers do not expect that dollars spent on home improvements will be returned 
at the time they sell their dwelling, then implicit discount rates will also reflect this form 
of capital price depreciation. The capitalization of energy efficiency improvements should 
certainly be at issue for that segment of the market that will ultimately sell their homes. 
On the other hand, households that do not expect to sell their homes quickly should not 
be acutely sensitive to the recapture of their capital investment. A simple theoretical 
model illustrates these points. 
Suppose consumers consider the value V of a capital improvement which will reduce 
energy consumption by one dollar in perpetuity. If the consumer does not sell his home, 
he enjoys the benefits of the reduced energy savings forever. The value of the capital 
improvement is, in this case, 1 + l/r (i.e.,the current-period's "Savings plus the present
discounted value of the stream of one dollar savings received in future periods) . The
discount rate r can be determined from the equation r = 1 / (V - 1) and is given by the
ratio of the expected annual energy savings to the initial net capital expenditure. If, on 
the other hand, consumers do sell their homes, then the capital investment's recaptured 
·value becomes relevant.10 
100ur model assumes1 for simplicity, that the durable good has an infinite lifetime. In fact, most 
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Suppose that consumers face an exogenous probability p in any period of moving 
from their homes. In the event that the consumer moves, he sells his home to a willing 
buyer. In addition we assume that buyers are only willing to pay a fraction / of the real 
cost of the capital good. Provided the probability of moving occurs independently across 
periods, the optimality principle shows that V satisfies: 
1
V = 1 + - [(1 -p)V + p1V].
l+r 
(1) 
Equation (1) simply says that V is that value which returns one dollar in the current 
period plus the present discounted value of the expected future value where expectations 
are taken with respect to the exogenous probability of moving. With probability (1- p ),
the consumer does not move and therefore has an asset with present value V; but with 
probability p, the consumer sells his home and receives the under-capitalized value 1V. 
Using equation (1) we can solve for the equilibrium value of V: 
l+r 
V= ---­
r+p-n 
(2) 
The implicit discount rate implied by equation (2) is clearly a function of both the 
probability of moving and the degree of capitalization. Consumers discount at the rate 
r + p(l -1) when calculating the value of the capital improvement. When p = 0, the 
probability of moving is zero and the relevant event horizon is infinite.11 In this case, 
V = (1 + r)/r-the value we found before. When the market fully capitalizes the capital 
good, I = 1, and again V = (1 + r) / r. In this case, the uncertain event horizon has 
no affect on the valuation. Finally, when the market fully discounts the capital good, 
I= 0 and V = (1 + r)/(r + p) which shows that the relevant discount rate increases by 
the probability of moving (an event which, in this case, forces the consumer to sustain a 
complete loss of his investment). 
Equation (2) can be used to recover implicit discount rates using the estimated rela­
tionships determined from probabilistic choice models or from hedonic regression mod­
els. Each empirical approach provides an estimate of the tradeoff between operating and 
durable goods have tillite lifeti�es over which they experience some physical depreciation. In additioni 
we assume that consumers' planning horizons are infinite. Our model is meant to be illustrative of a 
world in which the average period of time spent by the household in a given house is short relative 
to the lifetime of the durable under consideration. Our formulation is similar to Levhari and Mirman 
(1977) who consider the case of non-stochastic investment decisions made by consumers with stochastic 
lifetimes. 
11Throughout the ren1ai11der of this paper, we will use the term event horizon to denote the length of 
time a household owns a given house. 
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capital costs. However, one important distinction must be made. The logic of the prob­
abilistic choice model develops the tradeoff between operating and capital costs at the 
time of capital purchase. A typical specification of indirect utility for durable purchase 
assumes, for example, that: 
U = (3' X + (31 (Capital Cost) + (32 (Operating Cost) + E. 
The estimated tradeoff between capital and operating costs (the effect on capital cost 
from a one dollar reduction in operating costs) is given by 
d(Capital Cost) 
= 
S / S 
d( Operation Cost) 
2 l · 
The logic of the hedonic regression studies develops the tradeoff between realized capital 
values and future operating cost savings. In a typical hedonic regression model, the price 
of the home P is taken to be a linear-in-parameters function of housing characteristics 
and the annual energy bill: 
p = >.' z + A1(BILL) + E 
In this case the estimated tradeoff between capital values and operating cost savings, 
dP / d(BILL) = �1. Since �1 measures the effect of a one dollar decrease in operating
costs on the realized capital value, it is not directly comparable to the estimate S2/ S1 
determined within the probabilistic choice setting. The two estimates are related by the 
degree of capitalization I described above. Since ,\1 measures the realized value (i.e., 
resale value) of a one dollar reduction in operating cost and (32/ (31 measures the actual
value (i.e., cost) of a one dollar reduction in operating costs, we have: 
Using the stochastic horizon model, we know that either (,\if/) or ((32/ (31) can provide
an estimate of (1 + r)/(r + p - yy). Thus, under the maintained assumption that the
hedonic pricing and probabilistic choice approaches are comparable in the sense that they 
current capital costs, we can infer the degree of housing market capitalization: 
10 
(3) 
We have expressed I using the second equality in equation (3) because it is simply the 
ratio of the "standard discount rates" (without correction for uncertain event horizons 
or similar adjustments for real price escalation) as calculated in the literature from the 
probabilistic choice models and the hedonic regression models respectively. 
While in theory it is possible to measure both the degree of capitalization and the 
implicit average event duration, the immediate absence of parallel studies which attempt 
to both analyze consumer durable choices and housing prices within the same time frame 
and within the same geographic market preclude such a calculation. However, the follow­
ing empirical regularity should be observed. One would reasonably expect that areas with 
colder climates would more fully capitalize the value of energy conserving capital invest­
ments. Other things equal, this implies that discount rates obtained from probabilistic 
choice models in cold regions should be larger than those obtained from probabilistic 
choice studies conducted in areas with more moderate temperatures. This was precisely 
the pattern discovered in Dubin (1985) when identically estimated choice models were 
compared for space heating durable equipment in the Pacific Northwest with estimates 
obtained from a study of purchase decision made in the U.S. at large. 
Our simple model of stochastic event horizons also provides insight into the likely 
bias that previous estimates of discount rates could have experienced. Equation (2) 
implies that for a given estimate of V (using either >.i/1 or (32/ (31), the implicit functional
relationship between r and p makes or/ op negative provided that pis not too large (a very 
short expected tenure) or I is not too small (very little capitalization). Since discount 
rates have been calculated in the literature under the implicit assumption that p = 0, we 
should expect that the more reasonable assumption of non-zero p would lower previously 
estimated implicit discount rates.12 
4 Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that probabilistic choice studies of consumer durable pur­
chases and hedonic housing 'priceTegression'studies measure,similar but non-identical 
discount factors. The difference between the two methods embodies the tendency of the 
market for residential dwellings to less than fully capitalize energy improvements. As 
long as the market Jails to fully capitalize conservation improvements in the residential 
12 According to equation (2), the maximum upward bias in the discount rate is equal to the proba­
bility of moving. Average turnover rates in the housing market of four to eight years imply maximum 
corrections to the discount rate from 12.5 to 25 percent. 
11 
housing stock, and provided that dwellings continue to be bought and sold by economic 
agents with differing levels of information, it continues to be possible for individual dis­
count rates to exceed the levels which are socially desirable for optimal social decision 
making. Those factors which cause the degree of capitalization to differ from unity (such
as moral hazard, risk, uncertainty, and asymmetric information) make it entirely possi­
ble that consumers can and will make individual decisions which are rational from their 
perspectives but still lead to too-low levels of social conservation. 
12 
TABLE 1 
IMPLICIT DISCOUNT RATES FOR THERMAL INTEGRllY AND 
SPACE HEATING SYSTEM CHOICES 
General Implicit 
Study Approach Discount Comments 
Rate 1%1 
Space Heating System and Fuel Type 
Goott (1978) choice 36.0 Ualng preferred model. 
model 
Dubin (1985) choice 2.0-10.0 Depends on model specification. 
model 
Dubin (1988)° choice 6.5-10.5 Depends on model specification. 
model 
Goett and McFadden (1982) choice 6.5 • 16.0 Depends on model specification. 
model 
4.4 Households without central air 
Goott (1983) choice oondltionlng. 
model 21.0 Households with central air 
oonditlonlno. 
Berkovec, Hausman and Rust (1983) choice 25.0 
model 
Un Hirst and Cohn 119761 choice model 7.0-31.0 Deoends on fuel "''"'· 
Cambridge Systematica, Inc. et al. · choice model 67.6 Fumace replacement. 
119881 
Thennal Integrity MeasiJres 
10.0 Gas-heated homes. 
Corum and O'Neal (1982) engineering 14.0 Oil-heated homes. 
annroach 19.0-21.0 Becb'icltv..heated homes. 
Cambridge Systematics, Inc. et al. choice 39.6 Wall insulation. 
(1988) model 
Neta: Discount ratos are calculated assuming no real energy price appreciation and Infinite useful !He. Ail studios 
estimated loglt models. Cole and Fuller (1981) assume a 15-year useful life for measures; others assume an Infinite 
useful life. Un, Hirst and Cohn (1976) used aggregate data for estimation, while all others used Individual household 
data. 
Source: Newlon and Weitzel (1991). (Newlon and Weitzel note that table data was "derived from Cambridge 
Systematics, Inc., et al. (1988) or directly from the cited studies.") 
. 
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TABLE2 
IMPLICIT DISCOUNT RATES FOR REFRIGERATORS AND OTHER APPLICATIONS 
General Implicit 
Study Approach Discount Comments 
Rate 1%\ 
Refrigerators 
Compared extra cost of the more 
efficient of two refrigerators with Its 
Gately (1980) engineering reduced operating coats to calculate 
approach 45.0-300.0 rate of return on Investment 
Discount rates shown are Implied by 
nurchase of the leas-efficient modal. 
Discount rate estimated from 
MacRaa (1980) survey 53.0 customer survey responses 
a ...... roach reoardlno h·�othetical <>urchasea. 
Examined sales for a pair of models 
Molar and Whittier (1983) engineering from >34.0 In four parts of the countly. 
approach to >58.0 Calculated Implied minimum 
discount rate for purchasers of the 
leas-efficient model. 
Other Applications 
Goett (1983) choice 36.0 Cooking and water-heating fuel type. 
model 
Dubin (1985) choice 24.0 Water-heating fuel type. 
model 
Dubin (1986) choice 44.0 Water-heating fuel type. 
model 
Goett and McFadden (1982) choice 67.0 Water-heating fuel type. 
model 
Barkovac, Hausman and Rust (1983) choice 33.0 Water-heating fuel type. 
model 
I Cooking fuel type, rate depends onUn, Hitst and Cohn (1976) choice 18.0-31.0 fuel chosen. Choice of whether to 
model 23.5 nurchase a freezer. 
Cambridge Systematics, Inc. et al. choice 308.0 Clock thermostat. 
11988\ model 
Note: All studies used loglt models. Un, Hirst and Cohn (1976) used aggregate data for estimation while all others 
used indMdual household data. 
Source: Newlon and Weitzel (1991). (Newlon and Weitzel note that table data was "derived from Cambridge 
Systematics, Inc., et al. (1988) or dlractiy from Iha cited studies.") 
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Table 3 
STUDY REGION MODB.& SAMPLE EFACIENCY PROXY 
FUNCTIONAL FORM 
Johnson and Knoxville, Tennessee Hedonic; linear OLS Knoxville Board of Annual household utility 
Kasserman (1983) estimation Realtors' MLS report of bill 
houses sold In 1978 
(n • 1317) 
Longstreth, Coveney Columbus, Ohio Hadonic; polynomial Rosldences Included In Annual household 
and Bowers (1984) two-stage weighted the Columbus Gas of consumption of natural 
least squares Ohio 1973 natural gas gas (alternative model 
consumption records, estimated using 
and which changed presence of various 
ownership between efficiency attributes as 
1971 and 1980 efficiency proxy) 
(n 
= 615) 
Laquatra (1986) Minneapolis - St. Paul, Hadonlc: OLS Minnesota Housing Thermal Integrity factor 
Minnesota estimation Finance Agency Energy 
Efficient Housing 
Demonstration Program 
homes in the 
Minneapolis - St. Paul 
Metropolitan Statistical 
Noa (n = 81) • 
Dinan and Mlranowakl Greater Des Moines, Hedonlc; partial Box- Greater Des Molnea Predicted fuel bills per 
(1989) Iowa Cox estima.tion Board of Realtors' MLS square loot of heated 
report of single-family floor area, normaJized 
detached dwellings for temperature 
sold. In the period differences 
January through June, 
1982 
(n = 234) 
15 
Table4 
IMPLICIT MARKET DISCOUNT RATE 
STUDY IMPLICIT VALUE OF A ONE-DOU.AR FOR ZERO EXPECTED REAL FUEL 
REDUCTION IN ANNUAL FUEL BIU. PRICE GROWTH 1 (percent)
n= 15 25 50 
Johnson and Kasserman 20.73 - 1.S 4.2 
Longstreth, Coveney and Bowers 13.882 1.0 5.2 7.0 
Laquatra 46.643 - - 0.3 
Dinan and Mlranowskl 11.63 3.4 7.0 8.4 
1 Negative values not "'port•d. 
2Basad on the reported value ol S.107 lor a one hundred cubic foot reduction In annual natural gas consumption, and 
a mean residential natural gas prica In 1980 of $0.388 per hundred cubic feat !Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
.!i!!§, table 760). 
3Basad on the reported value of 53.82 lor a reduction In one TIF Q.e., a savings of one BTU per square foot per
heating degree day); a mean living space of 1300 square feet; and a mean residential natural gas price In 1982 of 
$5.17 per thousand cubic feet and normal seasonal heating degree days of 8007 !Statistical Abstract of the United 
.§!!!!!: 1988, tables 760 and 354, respectively). 
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